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Dear Reader:
The German Council on Foreign Relations has been a stronghold of  frank trans-
atlantic exchanges for a long time. In the Summer of  2007, we added to this re-
cord by exploring a wide range of  current transatlantic issues during our two-day 
conference “Europe and America: Managing the 21st Century’s Agenda.”
Under the aegis of  our Alfred von Oppenheim-Center for European Policy 
Studies and the Transatlantic Relations Program we invited leading authorities 
from both sides of  the Atlantic to address a wide array of  timely issues including 
nuclear proliferation, global warming and the increasingly difficult search for high-
qualified employees
Rather than bringing together familiar faces the conference made a strong point 
of  recruiting “non-usual suspects”—experts and younger analysts from the 
United States and Europe that come from different professional backgrounds 
in addition to “professional Atlanticists.” This way, DGAP took a fresh look at 
transatlantic challenges while simultaneously contributing to building new net-
works.
One thing was quite clear from the start: the days in which transatlantic coopera-
tion could be taken for granted are over. The common “21st Century’s Agen-
da”—that the conference title stipulates—has to be built anew. The conference 
focused on the practical and the doable. It avoided dwelling in old, romanticized 
memories of  the Cold War era and the run-of-the-mill talk about common values. 
Today, a difference is made by identifying common interests on pressing prob-
lems—and then concretely contributing to their resolving.
I am confident that we were able to retain some of  that spirit in the following 
pages, and I certainly hope you will enjoy following up on the results of  our con-
ference.
Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider
Otto Wolff-Director of  the Research Institute
Europe and America
International Conference 
Managing the 
21st Century’s Agenda
Doug Bandow, Chuck Peña, Jonas Böttler, John Hulsman, Wess Mitchell (left to right)
Managing the  
21st Century’s Agenda

Europe and America
International Conference
Europe and America:  
Managing the 21st Century’s Agenda
International Conference June 14-15, 2007 at the DGAP, Berlin
Introduction
On June 14 and 15, 2007 the DGAP in conjunction with its Alfred von Oppen-
heim Center for European Policy Studies and the Transatlantic Relations Pro-
gram hosted the International Conference “Europe and America: Managing the 
21st Century’s Agenda.” The conference brought together leading European and 
American thinkers for a two-day discussion on the development of  Transatlantic 
Relations within the context of  rapidly changing geopolitical realities. The con-
ference explored the degree of  commonality between European and American 
values in various policy arenas, rather than approaching debates from the conven-
tional standpoint that Euro-American relations necessarily maintain core similari-
ties. Its mission was expressed within the opening remarks of  Prof. Dr. Eberhard 
Sandschneider, director of  the DGAP research institute. Prof. Dr. Sandschneider 
opened with the observation that the days in which transatlantic cooperation 
could be taken for granted are over: a relationship that has experienced recent 
diplomatic pitfalls, been subject to the rise of  unanticipated political forces and 
exposed to new challenges must be reflected upon. By way of  officially wel-
coming conference participants, he asked rhetorically, “Is there truly a common 
transatlantic agenda?”
With this query in mind, the format of  the panels was well suited to the compari-
son and juxtaposition of  European and American views on current debates. Each 
discussion, moderated by a member of  Berlin’s policy community, featured two 
experts from each side of  the Atlantic. The moderators’ introductory remarks 
were followed by detailed and often disparate analyses on the topic at hand by a 
European and an American respectively, leaving room for debate and rebuttal and 
followed by an open forum for questions.
Panel I: Armageddon? Threat Perceptions and Security Strategies
Thursday’s first panel, “Armageddon? Threat Perceptions and Security Strate-
gies” featured Angelika Beer, Member of  European Parliament, spokesperson on 
Security Policy for the Greens/European Free Alliance Group and member of  
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on Security and Defense, 
and Charles Peña, Senior Fellow with the George Washington University Home-
land Security Policy Institute in Washington, DC, and former director of  defense 
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policy studies at the CATO Institute. Jan Techau, Head of  the DGAP’s Alfred 
von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, moderated a discussion that 
centered on disparities in threat perception between Europeans and Americans in 
21st century security policies and posed the question: “Is there indeed consensus 
on threat perception?”
A frank analysis of  Ms. Beer’s comments would point to a resolute “no” on the 
question of  consensus. The fractured response to Russian president Vladimir 
Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference 2007 revealed the extent of  
disparities between Europe and America in foreign policy, she suggested. Beer 
depicted transatlantic rifts in threat perceptions in three areas. First, in terms of  
missile defense: Ms. Beer stressed the point that thwarting the use of  missiles 
through the deployment of  more missiles is a misguided principle. She suggested 
that America’s fondness of  unilateralism—typified by negotiations over missile 
defense—is supported by both rhetoric and action. Second, Ms. Beer pointed to 
containment of  nuclear proliferation. In terms of  threats, she discussed the pos-
sibility of  a nuclear-equipped Pakistan governed by leaders unfriendly to the West. 
Ms. Beer recommended that the abandonment of  global nuclear ambitions might 
be the best option for ensuring security. Finally, the discussion turned to the “War 
on Terror”. As a continued point of  contention between Western leaders, the 
“War on Terror” reveals vastly different understandings on the utility of  force, Ms. 
Beer said. She argued that America’s abuse of  human rights is “a pattern, not an 
Angelika Beer and Jan Techau
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exception,” as a component of  the US campaign against terrorism. In a paral-
lel to earlier comments Ms. Beer warned that in 21st century geopolitics, force 
breeds more force and terror more terror; more importantly, the fundamental 
desire of  terrorists around the globe is to draw disproportionate and unintelligent 
response from the US.
Charles Peña began his remarks with a “reality check:” The threat of  Armaged-
don is no longer part of  security discussion and no longer a real concern. Even 
nuclear terror, though catastrophic, would not pose any legitimate threat of  an-
nihilation. What we have seen in the recent past is not an increase of  the global 
nuclear threat, he continued, but a management of  threat through the reduction 
of  nuclear arsenals. 
Peña painted a far different portrait of  threat perception than his European 
counterpart. He called European and American conception of  threats, “much the 
same,” and pointed towards the common goal of  preventing Iran from estab-
lishing a nuclear arsenal. Peña offered no apologies for the perception of  US 
unilateralism on the global stage. America’s approach to dealing with threats, “is 
all about US National Security,” he said. Multilateralism is a post cold war modus 
operandi that the US is indeed working to utilize as much as possible, but only 
when considered useful. Speaking to the concerns of  Iranian nuclear prolifera-
tion, Mr. Peña suggested that prominent fears of  the international community are 
Heinrich Kreft and Eberhard Sandschneider
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not realistic: The current understanding of  Iran as a threat to Israeli and broader 
European security presupposes a suicidal Iranian regime—any attack launched 
against a Western power would mean immediate military response aimed at Teh-
ran. Furthermore, the concept that Tehran would allow its nuclear warheads to 
fall into the hands of  terrorists is unfounded.
Peña considers divergence in threat perception as a function of  disparate ap-
proaches to terrorism. Fundamentally, Peña said, security is an issue of  sover-
eignty. The US shouldn’t dictate security issues in Europe just as European states 
wouldn’t dictate American security policy.
Angelika Beer
Interview with Angelika Beer
Question: How do you understand America’s unilateral actions on the world stage 
as opposed to Europe’s focus on multilateralism?
Angelika Beer: The basic difference is that, as I understand it, Europe is some-
thing like a game [to Americans like Mr. Peña]. Americans want to be able to 
employ unilateral decisions anywhere, vis-à-vis any country in this world in 
order to increase their own security.
Question: Can you explain the different approaches to Russia in terms of  the 
transatlantic relationship?
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Beer: In questions such as energy security, one wing—more the American wing 
—is ready to use force to secure energy sources. Europe tries to find a way of  
using negotiations in the global theater to make sure that energy is not used as 
a weapon [as in the case of  Russia]. That’s one example which shows that we 
need to deal with Russia as transatlantic partners. But it’s important to see that 
Russia has developed new confidence and is ready to challenge other countries’ 
national interests to show that it is back on the world stage.
Question: How should Europe work to protect its own foreign policy interests?
Beer: First, its not enough to merely say “can we agree or not on what Bush is 
saying.” To simply oppose him for opposition’s sake or wait till he is gone and 
there is a new government is not acceptable. Europeans must find their own 
positions and then come back and find a new basis on which to negotiate with 
[actors such as] Russian and the Americans about our interests.
Chuck Peña
Interview with Charles Peña
Question: How does the cat and mouse game between Iran and the US speak to 
the legitimacy of  each country’s leadership?
Charles Peña: Clearly Iran and America, in terms of  leadership, are in a kind of  
codependent state. Ahmadinejad says something and Bush says something back. 
It’s a circle of  rhetoric that reinforces what the other says. They almost need 
each other in order to bolster their individual cases.
Europe and America
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Question: What about the sense that Iran is currently lead by a man who is on a 
path of  self-destruction. Isn’t there a certain democratic tendency among the 
Iranian people?
Peña: Ahmadinejad may be the president, but he doesn’t run the country. The 
Mullahs still have a great degree of  sway and Ahmadinejad doesn’t call all the 
shots. There’s also no great love for the regime amongst the Iranian people. 
There isn’t a lot support [for the regime] but the population in Iran may feel 
complacent or feel helpless about the ability to change the course of  things. 
Question: So then why don’t Americans understand that?
Peña: There is a problem that Americans have generally speaking, with regard to 
foreign countries and foreign cultures, and then much more so [in reference to] 
the Middle East and the Muslim world. We don’t understand and aren’t as will-
ing to try and understand the differences in culture and history. Because of  9/11 
in particular … we tend to lump people together.
Question: Why has the missile defense issue been described in such ideological 
terms?
Peña: In the US, missile defense in particular has often been described as being a 
religious issue. You either believe in it wholeheartedly or are adamantly against it, 
and there’s no middle road.
Panel II: The Future of the West
Thursdays Second Panel, “The Future of  the West,” brought together Dr. Ulrich 
Speck, a journalist, prominent blogger and foreign policy analyst from Frank-
furt / Main, and Wess Mitchell, director of  research at the Center for European 
Policy Analysis in Washington, DC, for a discussion on the conference’s seminal 
issue: Where does the transatlantic relationship stand in reference to the greater 
scope of  21st century geopolitics? Jan-Philipp Görtz, the Director for Political 
and Government Affairs at Deutsche Lufthansa Berlin moderated a debate that 
begged the question: Will Western dominance hold in the face of  potential East-
ern approaches to world problems?
Mr. Görtz opened the panel invoking Ronald Reagan’s famous appeal to Mikhail 
Gorbachev to “tear down this wall!” as a means of  comparison. In 2007, Rea-
gan’s words show us both how far we have come and how much solidarity we 
have lost. 
Ulrich Speck’s commentary was a narrative of  the last 20 years in the transatlantic 
relationship: a partnership he characterizes as having evolved from the corner-
stone of  a “survival guarantee” for Western Europe to the “alliance of  choice,” 
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he sees in contemporary history. In Speck’s analysis, however, there still remains 
an element of  necessity in Europe’s dependence on America for military initia-
tive. Speck noted that a vision of  European autonomy, for instance, persisted 
until the crisis in the Balkans. He remarked that arguments between transatlantic 
partners point to a “lively partnership,” as opposed to a decaying alliance though 
the voices of  dissent are often heard quite loudly on the European side. The 
transatlantic marketplace, Speck continued, “is the backbone of  globalization,” 
and though Europeans may complain about the foreign policy blunders that have 
come from Washington policy, liberal democracy and free market capitalism con-
tinue to provide commonality.
Wess Mitchell spoke to the changing geopolitical order in terms that brought 
a sense of  immediacy to the discussion on transatlantic cooperation. Mitchell 
suggested the Western alliance must adapt to the reality that “the end of  western 
dominance is approaching.” What we are facing, he noted, is a huge reorder-
ing of  the international system founded in a redistribution of  global wealth. If  
the West has indeed been preparing for the imminent sea change, it has done so 
rather badly, said Mitchell, pointing to the near meltdown political environment 
in the Middle East and America’s aggressive foreign policy as tokens of  Western 
negligence. If  America and Europe intend on remaining competitive in the 21st 
century, a reordering of  their own is necessary. Noting that there is still time to 
change course, Mitchell offered a prescription, laying out his “Three B’s” of  21st 
century Western rehabilitation:
– Base: The United States, instead of  embarking upon adventures in nation-
building, needs to work on maintaining close relations with its allies (read: 
European states).
– Boundaries: Western powers need to clearly delineate conduct that they con-
sider unacceptable in the global arena. Treating governments on a case by 
case basis can breed hypocrisy and the deterioration of  the Western image.
– Bargains: Learning how to offer emerging powers a fair stake in the future 
will be a key to establishing and maintaining global homeostasis.
Interview with Ulrich Speck
Question: Do you see a new approach in American foreign policy these days?
Ulrich Speck: American foreign policy is always a mixture of  an idealistic view 
and a certain brand of  realism. The Americans always ask themselves if  they 
should use this [realist] approach and skip the idealistic view of  promoting 
democracy and changing the world, which challenges the status quo. What we 
heard today is that the American experts think of  America as a status quo pow-
Europe and America
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er. It’s a pendulum that swings back and forth. I wouldn’t see this as the definite 
new approach. I think that Washington is now considering a whole range of  
approaches.
Question: Where do you see the current state of  discussion on European com-
mon defense and security?
Speck: In security matters there is still the expectation [among the Americans] 
that the Europeans raise their defense budgets or have better coordination. But 
there are not many incentives for European policy makers to raise their defense 
budgets. Europeans don’t feel threatened.
Question: Why is that?
Speck: Europeans expect at the end of  the day that the Americans think defend-
ing Europe is still a core American interest.
Question: Why was there was so much emphasis on cooperation after the G8 
summit in June? 
Speck: I think we’re now in a situation where the public on both sides of  the 
Atlantic expects cooperation. But these big events are very much about public 
relations. I honestly don’t see much substance in these summits.
Wess Mitchell, Jan-Philipp Görtz, and Ulrich Speck (left to right)
Interview with Wess Mitchell
Question: Can you point to any mistakes in current American foreign policy?
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Wess Mitchell: The United States should understand itself  in the world today 
to be a status quo power. I think it’s a very peculiar thing that a hegemon, the 
leading power in the international system, is a revisionist power. It shouldn’t be 
that way. I think it’s only because of  a misunderstanding of  the incentives and 
disincentives that the US faces that we’re somehow positioning ourselves as 
what Condoleeza Rice calls “a revolutionary power.”
Question: Why does transatlantic debate often revolve around a discussion of  
common values?
Mitchell: I think there’s a tendency in certain foreign policy circles to overstress 
values a) because its what everyone’s been talking about for so long but b) 
because it allows us to avoid the hard work of  actually sitting down and talking 
about specific issues. On specific issues we may have, generally speaking, com-
mon values but we may have very different interests and I think we need to be 
prepared for that. We face very specific issues, and a discussion of  values will 
only take us so far in addressing those issues.
Question: To what extent does further transatlantic cooperation depend on a new 
American presidency?
Mitchell: We certainly shouldn’t expect to see the current US president use wan-
ing and dwindling political capital to mend fences with European allies. How-
ever, I think where we see some promise on this issue is in the current wave 
European leadership. As fate would have it, just as our American president is 
Wess Mitchell
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leaving we have a generation of  European leaders that appear to be interested 
in [closer cooperation]. A lot depends on how much political capital the next 
president is willing to invest in it. I think it remains to be seen but I think the 
prospects are very good.
Panel III: Rising Asia
Thursday’s final panel, “Rising Asia” featured Doug Bandow on the American 
side, Cobden Fellow in International Economics at the Institute for Policy Inno-
vation and Vice President of  Policy for Citizen Outreach in Washington, DC, and, 
on the European side, Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director of  
the DGAP’s Research Institute and host of  the conference. Dr. Heinrich Kreft 
of  the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group moderated a discussion that probed the 
commonalities and differences in European and American approaches to the rise 
of  Asian powers, specifically focusing on China as a token of  the region’s expo-
nential growth and influence. 
Bandow began with an analysis of  diverging US and European perceptions on 
Asia. Europe’s primary concern is consistent, positive American involvement in 
Pacific relations, said Bandow. Ironically, Europe’s most important relationship 
vis à vis Asia is the United States. For America however, the issue is far more 
complicated. The perception of  Asia (particularly China) as a threat continues to 
swell in relation to the region’s growth, said Bandow. America’s growing trade ties 
with China, its increasing external debt to Beijing and Chinese military buildup 
continue to ruffle feathers in Washington. China’s regional dominance is cur-
rently a foregone conclusion, says Bandow, but its imminent emergence as a 
global power is not yet given. Economic growth continues at a healthy rate, but 
there remain a laundry list of  obstacles that Beijing must overcome. Though the 
common perception is that “You can’t stop China,” the ruling elites in Beijing 
are still faced with the problem of  privatizing banking, an unrepresented peasant 
population and a political evolution that seems to be lagging behind the country’s 
economic progress. Asia is also not merely confined to a Chinese monolith, re-
minds Bandow. In India, the global arena might be seeing a healthy counterweight 
and a major player in the flattened global economy. Japan is currently flirting with 
remilitarization and is rethinking its role in the world as a true power, not just a 
commercial business entity. In North Korea, the gravest threat is not necessar-
ily nuclear arsenal and looming promises to abandon nuclear ambition, but the 
probability of  state implosion and the task of  regional reconstruction. And South 
Korea’s rising anti-Americanism and developing relationship with China has 
been ringing bells within Washington’s foreign policy community. None of  this, 
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remarked Bandow, is to say anything of  Taiwan, which looms as an enormous 
question mark for both European and American interests. What we need, says 
Bandow—as a transatlantic alliance and in the interest of  a balanced Asia—is 
more assertive regional actors in South Korea, Japan and India.
Professor Sandschneider, who has written extensively on China, portrayed rising 
Asian powers as the primary issue in the transatlantic alliance. In opening, he 
responded directly to the questions posed in the panel’s introductory description. 
Do Europe and the United States have a common idea about the rise of  Asia? 
“Yes,” said Sandschneider. Is China a threat or a prosperous ground of  opportuni-
ties? “Both, depending on your viewpoint.” Can we devise common transatlantic 
strategies for dealing with emerging global powers? Prof. Sandschneider seemed 
doubtful in response. Finally, how will Europe and the United States manage to 
dovetail their divergent interests in the region? “With difficulty, if  at all.” Prof. 
Sandschneider’s final response set the tone for a description of  China as a coun-
try of  multifaceted interests that is merely working to stake out its role among 
global leaders. Why should we blame China for ignoring Western outcries of  
human rights abuse, of  not playing by our rules of  Intellectual Property Rights 
or of  floating its currency when we (the West) are clearly not prepared to do 
anything in response? If  China has a strategy, it is this, said Prof. Sandschneider, 
“Whatever works will be done.” Reevaluation is the task of  the transatlantic alli-
ance, not of  China. Perhaps the rise of  Asia and the rise of  autocracies as legiti-
Doug Bandow and Heinrich Kreft (left to right)
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Key-Note Speech: Exporting Democracy and Nation-Building
John C. Hulsman, DGAP’s Alfred von Oppenheim Scholar, offered four simple 
lessons in state building from the great British officer T. E. Lawrence. Huls-
man said that respect for history could help keep America out of  future misad-
ventures like the present situation in Iraq. America’s present day difficulties in 
democracy building in Iraq illustrate a depressing ideological sameness. Whether 
we are talking about Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Iraq, one 
constantly runs into the same failed philosophy. Top-down, state-building 
efforts imposed from outside, efforts that pay little more than lip-service to 
the ideal of  making locals stakeholders in the process, are doomed to failure. 
Instead, we would do well to recall the life of  the gallant British officer, T. E. 
Lawrence. As a historical figure, Lawrence was immortalized by Peter O’Toole’s 
famous portrayal in the movie Lawrence of  Arabia. Embellishment aside, the 
core of  Lawrence’s brilliance is contained within what he thought and how he 
operated, as much as for what he actually did. Juxtaposed against Lawrence, the 
Bush administration’s follies in Iraq would serve as an almost comic foil, if  not 
so many lives had been destroyed.
John Hulsman and Eberhard Sandschneider (left to right)
mate and powerful players in the realm of  international relations are conditions 
that the West, as individual actors, will simply have to get used to.
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Lesson #1: It is critical to accurately assess the unit of  politics in a failed state.
Instead of  looking for Thomas Jefferson, Western elites must work with coun-
tries as they find them. In the case of  modern Iraq, the unit of  politics is reli-
gious and ethnic, with the three primary building blocks being the Shia (roughly 
60% of  the population), the formerly ruling Sunnis (20%) and the Kurds 
(around 20%). Early utopian efforts to ignore this reality and talk of  supporting 
“Iraqis” rather than working with Iraq’s genuine building blocks has died down, 
blunted by the gloomy day-to-day political realities.
Lesson #2: To work against the grain of  history is to fail at state building.
To immediately and artificially impose Western standards on a failed non-West-
ern state while disregarding its own unique culture is to court disaster. For ex-
ample, naive American efforts to limit the role of  Islam in the new Iraq did little 
more than alienate Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the key representative of  the Shia.
Lesson #3: Local elites must be made stakeholders in any successful state-build-
ing process.
In disbanding the Iraqi army, Paul Bremer, the American viceroy in Baghdad, 
unwittingly laid the groundwork for a period in which it was the American-led 
coalition, rather than a fusion of  American and Iraqi military forces, that be-
came responsible for the security of  the country. This was perhaps America’s 
Fritjof von Nordenskjöld (center) exchanging views with participants during coffee break
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greatest mistake in state building in Iraq, for it meant that the West, rather than 
Iraqis themselves, took the lead in rebuilding the country.
Lesson #4: A Western country should engage in the arduous process of  state 
building only when primary national security interests are at stake.
In the Great War, Lawrence became convinced that the defeat of  Turkey was 
possible through energizing the Arab Revolt and that this would prove greatly 
beneficial to a hard-pressed Britain. American efforts at state building ought 
to be discussed in similarly hard-headed terms. The 1990s American efforts at 
state building display an undifferentiated quality in terms of  American national 
interests. The Clinton Administration never met a failed state it did not want to 
intervene in, however peripheral to American interests (Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, 
Bosnia).
The differentiation of  when and where to engage in state building, guided by 
national interest calculations, will stop an overextended America from frittering 
away for little gain the competitive advantages that have made it the dominant 
power in the world. Sometimes the answer is no. As John Quincy Adams put it, 
“America is the well-wisher to the freedom of  all. She is the guarantor of  only 
her own.” State building is simply too complicated to be attempted more than 
necessary—it should be engaged in only when primary American interests are at 
stake.
Iraq has quieted the state-building lobby in Washington, but only for the mo-
ment. Doubtless, soon they will rise up, blandly explaining that it is the Presi-
dent’s incompetence, rather than their precious, top-down state-building strategy, 
that is to blame for the disaster in Iraq. When the moment arrives, it is up to the 
rest of  us, guided by a rudimentary knowledge of  history, to present them with 
a copy of  Lawrence’s masterpiece, The Seven Pillars of  Wisdom.
Interview with John Hulsman
Question: What is the implication for NATO given failure in Afghanistan?
John Hulsman: In a word it would be catastrophic. I think Afghanistan began very 
well, we worked with the locals in establishing a bottom up approach and then 
we took out eye off  the ball because of  Iraq. This was the one we all agreed on. 
This isn’t Iraq, we all agreed that this was worth doing and now we can’t get the 
Germans to come south and fight where the [danger] is. If  you’re not going to 
share risk in an alliance, then it’s not much of  an alliance. Its not that NATO 
will cease to exist, it will just become another alphabet soup organization. 
People won’t use it as a tool. 
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Question: Why is it that only now are the neo-cons being taken to task on Iraq?
Hulsman: It’s only when things begin to go wrong in the real world that most of  
the country, who have other concerns, begin to notice. Those of  us who fol-
lowed that have been waving our arms frantically for a number of  years now. 
But it’s only when the bottom fell out in terms of  domestic public opinion that 
people began to realize. 
Question: How do US party politics affect the foreign policy debate?
Hulsman: Really both parties don’t make sense anymore in a foreign policy sense. 
Both parties currently have civil wars. The liberal hawks in the Clinton admin-
istration wanted to socially engineer the world in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and 
the Bush people want to do so in Iraq. That’s the underlying theme: They have 
more in common. So the notion of  party doesn’t make a whole lot of  sense in 
the new world of  geopolitics.
Question: Why has realism as a foreign policy approach been underrepresented 
during the Iraq war?
Hulsman: Realists have always been somewhat reserved. Where we lose is that 
utopians argue the false point that ‘we meant well.’ Their plans still trump 
ours because they have a grand vision and a utopian idealistic streak—one that 
Americans in general certainly have. My goal ultimately is to leave the United 
States better than I found it. I believe that the US is indeed the last best hope in 
this world, I believe that profoundly. My vision is a moral vision and an attrac-
Eberhard Sandschneider
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tive vision for Americans. That is the key moral link in realism. We have shied 
away from making that argument because we don’t like talking about moral-
ity. However, we darned well better start or we’re never going to do well in an 
America that talks about both ethics and realism. 
Question: How has your approach to foreign policy discussion been received in 
Europe?
Hulsman: Well, the reality now is that when I say “trust me” I am always fighting 
against suspicion. Look at missile defense. Even when the Bush people are right 
on policy no one listens to them, and that’s the price you pay [for foreign policy 
missteps]. Realism is about restoring that goodwill, and realists would say it will 
take decades, but lets do it. We need to go back to longer-term thinking.
Panel IV: War for Talent
Friday’s opening panel, “War For Talent,” dealt with the challenge of  remaining 
competitive in a globalized business environment. Representing the European 
angle was Dr. Christine Stimpel, Managing partner of  Heidrick and Struggles Ex-
ecutive Search, a “headhunting” firm based in Dusseldorf. Offering the American 
perspective was Prof. Robert Lieber, Professor of  government and international 
affairs at Georgetown University in Washington, DC. The discussion focused on 
business and cultural factors that attract or deter qualified employees to particu-
lar countries. Stephan Gutzeit, Member of  the Executive Board of  the Charité 
Foundation in Berlin, moderated the panel. In opening, Gutzeit spoke to the 
stereotypes of  American and European business models: America, as “land of  
opportunity” is thought of  as possessing an eternal entrepreneurial spirit based 
on creativity, ideas and the capacity for change. Europe, on the other hand is 
branded as hierarchical, slow to innovation and lacking in the spirit that has de-
fined the American dream.
To a limited degree, the comments of  Dr. Stimpel affirmed the opening remarks. 
“In Germany, the demand for leadership is … higher than the supply,” and neither 
the dearth of  leaders nor the conversation on possible solutions is novel—Ger-
many has bemoaned its lack of  executive potential since the internet boom of  the 
90s. The explanation for the phenomenon is, simply put, an effect of  the draw 
of  other markets—German executive salaries are not competitive with the vast 
sums of  money many American business leaders command. However, Dr. Stim-
pel reminded the audience that the limits of  executive talent is not confined to 
Germany, but will soon be a global problem: “in America 50% of  business lead-
ers will retire within the next three years”; in China’s rapidly globalizing system, 
managers with required international business experience are increasingly harder 
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to find. As the economic “center of  gravity” naturally pulls away from the West, 
transatlantic business partners (German in particular) must “invest in talent,” says 
Stimpel. If  incentives such as competitive salaries and flexible business practices 
are not there, talented young businessmen and women will simply move to where 
the opportunities are more attractive. 
Professor Lieber’s spoke of  American business practices in equally complimen-
tary terms. Asked why the American dream continues to persist despite low in-
ternational public opinion and a growing wealth gap, Lieber stressed, “because it 
continues to be a reality.” The United States is the beneficiary of  a sort of  multi-
culturalism and absorption capacity that extends to the realm of  business, making 
flexibility and adaptability the norm. It is no coincidence that 70% of  all living 
Nobel Laureates are employed in the United States, notes Lieber, “writers [on 
economy] talk about the notion of  ‘animal spirits’ as being crucial to innovation, 
economic advancement and creativity,” and the American focus on private sector 
competition is the playing field for such spirit. Prof. Lieber’s discussion was not 
entirely complimentary, however. He noted that, as a result of  increased border 
security and the greater push for homeland protection, “US immigration policy 
seems to be selecting for the least qualified” visa applicants. Furthermore, though 
American education plays an enormous role in instilling entrepreneurial values 
among its educated classes, the cost of  higher education in the States creates an 
exclusivity and aura of  inaccessibility for those outside of  the system. 
Christine Stimpel, Stephan Gutzeit, and Robert Lieber (left to right)
Interview with Robert Lieber
Question: Despite opinion polls that show America’s image sinking, the American 
dream persists. Can you explain the phenomenon?
Robert Lieber: The dream continues to be a reality: The immigrant family achieves 
middle class status and the children go on to live in prosperity. And though the 
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Robert Lieber and Christine Stimpel
current trend of  anti-Americanism is real and troubling, is not unique. Some 
of  the problem is real, some of  it is cyclical and a good deal of  it rests on wild 
exaggerations. 
Question: How does the economics community perceive of  the success of  the 
capitalist model?
Robert Lieber: Writers on economics and on capitalism talk about the notion of  
“animal spirits,” a sort of  optimism, energy and entrepreneurship and a sense of  
adventure that’s crucial to innovation and economic advancement and creativity 
in the successful operation of  an ever changing and adaptive economy. I think 
successful market economies have learned how to foster these tendencies. 
Question: How can legislators in market economies effectively regulate hedge 
funds?
Robert Lieber: You need to be careful of  how you regulate so you don’t throw 
the baby out with the bathwater. The task of  legislation and regulators is to find 
ways of  making sure that there is more of  a level playing field without undercut-
ting the entrepeneurial drive that you want in a modern economy.
Panel V: How to Tackle Climate Change
On the heels of  promises made at the G8 summit at Heiligendamm, Friday’s final 
panel “How to Tackle Climate Change,” offered a timely discussion on common 
strategies and continued differences between European and American approach-
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es to dealing with global warming. Panelists R. Andreas Kraemer, Director of  the 
Ecologic Institute for International and European Environmental Policy in Berlin, 
and Patrick Moon, Director of  the Office of  Austrian, German and Swiss Affairs 
of  the US State Department, both spoke to the implications of  the statements 
coming out of  the G8 and the resulting capacity for change in policy creation.
Kraemer sees a victory for champions of  Climate Change policy in the willing-
ness of  G8 leaders to officially agree on the gravity of  global warming, but cited 
disappointment in the lack of  specificity on cited goals. He called the statement 
out of  Heligendamm “Long on energy supply debate … weak on renewables … 
very weak on efficiency.” The common perception on climate change policy is 
that the American approach is market-based, while the European is state con-
trolled, remarked Kraemer. As a corrective, Kraemer noted that these stereo-
types are misleading, and pointed to the European Carbon trading scheme as an 
example of  market-based innovation. According to Kraemer, the difficulty in US 
Climate Change policy is not its market-based underpinning, but the inability and 
unwillingness of  the federal government to respond to individual state initiatives 
and public pressure. One sees “more similarities than differences” in the role do-
mestic pressure plays into the climate change debate in Germany versus the US, 
said Kraemer, “the main difference is that you have a completely different way 
in which public concerns and public pressures are translated into federal policy 
making.” He suggested that, as transatlantic partners, the EU and US look to in-
R. Andreas Kraemer and Stefan Theil (left to right)
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vest in changing technologies outside of  the popular fixation on ethanol, biomass 
and hydrogen, all of  which have shown proven drawbacks that seem to outweigh 
benefits. But its not merely an issue of  technologies, “governments need to create 
the right framework,” and follow innovation. Finding opportunities for coopera-
tion—such as the state of  California’s 40 member delegation’s recent visit to the 
European Commission—is the key to both.
Patrick Moon, speaking as an official representative of  the United States Depart-
ment of  State, said that the American approach to tackling climate change, “is 
working.” Moon pointed to figures that showed emissions decreases within the 
United States in relation to population growth, compared with regional figures in 
China which have increased considerably in conjunction with growing industrial 
might. The key to mitigating climate change is a hands on approach through in-
vestment in rising Asian powers, suggested Moon, a sentiment that Kraemer later 
agreed with during open discussion. However, Moon also expressed optimism on 
the results of  Heiligendamm, calling the agreement “a [US] commitment to the 
UN process” and evidence of  consensus on the issue of  climate change. During 
discussion, he challenged the European Carbon trading scheme, saying that EU 
programs have not been as successful as has been claimed but echoed Kraemer’s 
call for the innovation and motivation of  new technologies.
Patrick Moon
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Interview with R . Andreas Kraemer
Question: Can you compare the role the public debate plays in Europe vs. the 
United States in terms of  climate change?
R. Andreas Kraemer: There are more similarities than differences. If  you look at 
the positions of  environmental organizations across the Atlantic, they’re very 
similar, trade union positions are very similar, the initiatives by universities or by 
churches are very similar, the policies adopted in municipalities, in towns and 
in cities are very similar. The main difference is in a specific area of  the United 
States that has very little exposure to news from outside the US and therefore 
has a very domestic understanding. There is also a completely different way in 
which public concerns and pressures are translated into federal policy making.
Question: And how do federal policies translate into domestic policies?
Kraemer: Americans have significantly lower taxes on fuels. But if  you compare 
the cost of  driving a car, it costs about the same in Europe and in the US. The 
difference is that in the US the cars consume more gas per mile and a higher 
proportion of  the total bill goes to the energy suppliers. So it goes towards the 
Saudi sheiks that pump the oil out of  the ground and to the other oil export-
ing countries. In Europe, a higher proportion of  what the motorist pays goes 
into the tax coffers of  government, which can then fund certain programs like 
health care, education and social programs.
Key-Note Speech: Shifts in the Transatlantic Economy
Friday’s key-note speech “Shifts in the Transatlantic Economy” was delivered by 
Italian Ambassador to Germany, Antonio Puri Purini. DGAP Executive Vice 
President Ambassador Fritjof  von Nordenskjöld moderated a talk that centered 
on the economic relationship between the United States and the European 
Union and its role as the centerpiece of  a truly strong and integrated transat-
lantic partnership. Purini’s thoughts mirrored a common sentiment expressed 
throughout the conference as a whole: the transatlantic relationship’s major 
obstacle is “too much talk” and not enough action. However, also in concert 
with the greater majority of  panel participants, Purini sees commonality in 
the Western approach to building consensus, “our disagreements reveal areas 
of  agreement,” he said. Our mission as an alliance is, above all, to ensure the 
stability and well-being of  the international community, to speak truths to one 
another in transparent discussion and to protect shared interests. 
Turning to the issue of  European integration, Purini’s words were more pointed 
and pushed for progress in further institutional design. Unity on the European 
level, he said, will allow for a stronger partnership with the US, will increase the 
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effectiveness of  the Union outwards and will ensure staying power. The other 
option, a rollback of  institutional framework, would be disastrous. Europe, 
which has not been entirely effective at communicating its broader goals, must 
define its common targets for the next 60 years and it must seek closer partner-
ship with the US through three arenas:
1) A true transatlantic economy;
2) Climate Protection in a bilateral as well as UN framework and;
3) Energy security.
In closing, Ambassado Purini stressed the interdependence of  the United States 
and Europe and reminded conference attendees that trade and finance, as both 
the strongest area of  EU unity and the strongest bond in the transatlantic alli-
ance, should be the starting point for expansion in Atlantic cohesion.
Antonio Puri Purini
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June 14–15, 2007, DGAP, Rauchstraße 17/18, 10787 Berlin, Germany
	 	 1st	day:	Thursday,	June	14th	2007
from	noon	 	 Conference	Registration
1:00–2:00pm	 	 Welcome	Lunch
2:15pm	 	 Official	Welcome
Prof.	Dr.	Eberhard	Sandschneider, Otto 
Wolff-Director of  the Research Institute, 
DGAP, Berlin
2:30–3:30pm	 Panel	I:	 Armageddon?	Threat	Perceptions	and	
Security	Strategies
What is the likelihood of  terrorists employ-
ing WMD against the West? How real is the 
danger of  a large-scale nuclear attack? Are 
the United States and Europe prepared for 
a nuclear-armed Islamist Pakistan? How 
dangerous is the transatlantic gap of  threat 
perception and how can we narrow it?
Speakers:	 Angelika	Beer, MEP, Spokesperson on Se-
curity Policy of  the Greens / European Free 
Alliance Group, Member of  the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Subcommittee on 
Security and Defence, Brussels
Charles	V.	Peña, Senior Fellow at the In-
dependent Institute, Senior Fellow with the 
George Washington University Homeland 
Security Policy Institute, Washington, DC
Moderator:	 Jan	Techau, Head of  Program, Alfred von 
Oppenheim-Centre for European Policy 
Studies, DGAP, Berlin
3:30–4:00pm	 	 Coffee	Break/Refreshments
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4:00–5:00pm	 Panel	II:	 The	Future	of 	the	West
Throughout the 20th century, the West 
provided the dominating ideas, models, and 
strategies governing international relations. 
Will this dominance hold? How different 
are potential “Eastern” approaches to world 
problems? Are they reconcilable with the way 
the West thinks and acts? Is there a common 
Western destiny in the 21st century? Or will 
the West split up and fade away?
Speakers:	 Dr.	Ulrich	Speck, Journalist and Foreign 
Policy Analyst (Kosmoblog), Frankfurt / Main
Wess	Mitchell, Director of  Research, Center 
for European Policy Analysis, Washington, 
DC
Moderator:	 Jan-Philipp	Görtz, Director Political and 
Government Affairs, Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 
Berlin
5:00–5:30pm	 	 Coffee	Break/Refreshments
Doug Bandow
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5:30–6:30pm	 Panel	III:	 Rising	Asia
Do Europe and the United States have a com-
mon idea about the rise of  Asia? Is China a 
threat or a prosperous land of  opportunities? 
Can we devise common transatlantic strate-
gies for dealing with emerging global powers? 
How will Europe and the United States man-
age to dovetail their divergent interests in the 
region?
Speakers:	 Doug	Bandow, Cobden Fellow in Interna-
tional Economics at the Institute for Policy 
Innovation and Vice President of  Policy for 
Citizen Outreach, Washington, DC
Prof.	Dr.	Eberhard	Sandschneider, Otto 
Wolff-Director of  the Research Institute, 
DGAP, Berlin
Moderator:	 Dr.	Heinrich	Kreft, Senior Foreign Policy 
Advisor to the CDU/CSU Parliamentary 
Group, Berlin
6:30–7:00pm	 	 Alfred	von	Oppenheim	Essay	Award	&	
Reception
Cesare Merlini, Doug Bandow, and Chuck Peña (left to right)
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Prof.	Dr.	Eberhard	Sandschneider, Otto-
Wolff-Director of  the Research Institute, 
DGAP, Berlin
7:00–8:00pm	 	 Dinner
8:00–9:00pm	 Key-note	Speech	 Exporting	Democracy	and		
Nation-Building
Dr.	John	C.	Hulsman, Alfred von Oppen-
heim Scholar, DGAP, Berlin
Moderator:	 Jan-Friedrich	Kallmorgen, Head of  Trans-
atlantic Relations Program, DGAP, Berlin
9:00pm	 	 Informal	Get-Together
End	of 	first	Conference	day
Eberhard Sandschneider, Heinrich Kreft, Jan Bittner, and Franz-Josef Meiers (left to right)
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	 	 2nd	day	:	Friday,	June	15th	2007
9:00–10:00am	 	 Breakfast	Reception
10:00–11:00am	Panel	IV:	 War	for	Talent
Innovation and education are the key fac-
tor for global competitiveness. How can the 
West continue to win the contest for the best 
brains in the world? Where are the knowledge 
centers of  the future? How will the increased 
output of  qualified science and technology 
specialists affect the future of  our educational 
systems?
Speakers:	 Dr.	Christine	Stimpel, Managing Partner of  
Heidrick & Struggles Executive Search 
GmbH, Düsseldorf
Prof.	Robert	Lieber, Professor of  Govern-
ment and International Affairs, Georgetown 
University, Washington, DC
Moderator:	 Stephan	Gutzeit, Charité Foundation, Mem-
ber of  the Executive Board, Berlin
11:00–11:30am		 Coffee	Break/Refreshments
John Hulsman, Elizabeth Pond, and Jackson Janes (left to right)
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11:30–12:30pm	Panel	V:	 How	to	Tackle	Climate	Change
Is there a common Western strategy to the 
challenge posed by global warming? How do 
we reconcile America’s market- and technol-
ogy-based approach with Europe’s state-cen-
tric and interventionist policies? What can 
companies contribute? Are we going to see an 
“ecologic industry?” 
Speakers:	 R.	Andreas	Kraemer, Director, Ecologic 
– Institute for International and European 
Environmental Policy, Berlin
Patrick	S.	Moon, Director, Office of  Aus-
trian, German and Swiss Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of  State, Washington, DC
Moderator:	 Stefan	Theil, Bureau Chief  Newsweek Ger-
many, Berlin
1:00–2:00pm	 Key-note	Speech	 Shifts	in	the	Transatlantic	Economy
Amb.	Antonio	Puri	Purini, Ambassador of  
the Republic of  Italy to Germany, Berlin
Moderator Amb. Fritjof  von Nordenskjöld, Executive 
Vice President, DGAP, Berlin
2:00pm	 	 Lunch	Buffet
5:00–7:00pm	 	 “Transatlantic	BBQ”	at	DGAP
End	of 	Conference
Impressum
Oktober 2007 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V. 
Rauchstraße 17/18 
10787 Berlin 
Germany
Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0 
Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16
info@dgap.org 
www.dgap.org
Fotos: 
Eva Knoll 
Umschlagfoto: Patrick Wagner

